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INTRODUCTION
The Warsaw conference took place on the occasion of the
sixtieth anniversary of NATO and the tenth anniversary of
Poland’s accession to the Alliance. There was an atmo-
sphere of celebration and historic satisfaction, as we here –
like our friends and partners in Budapest and Prague, in
Bratislava and Vilnius, in Riga and Tallinn, in Bucharest
and Sofia – have acted in the belief that membership in
NATO and in the European Union finally closed one of the
darkest chapters in our history.
The human and material price that Poland paid (and is
still paying) was colossal. Indeed, it was of such magnitude
that we often say that for us the Second World War only
ended in 1989. The political and strategic reversal of our
geo-political fate – of having two powerful and imperialist
neighbours – was a direct result of our membership in the
Alliance and its strong security guarantees, as afforded by
Article V.
Germany has now become a close ally. Russia, with its
‘phantom pains’ of an empire lost, its territorial revisionism,
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its outdated proposals of a ‘concert of nations’ and spheres
of influence proposals, its concept of ‘sovereign democ-
racy’, and its dubious human rights record, remains
a disquieting ‘big unknown’ and source of anxiety. As
Russia’s politics seem to be strongly anchored in the
twentieth century, we cannot look elsewhere, pretend that
everything is OK and agree optimistically that history has
truly ended. It did not end for Russia, so it cannot end for
Russia’s neighbours. Given our history, we in Central and
Eastern Europe are the worrying types.
And so ten years and a few military missions later,
Poland is celebrating one of our most momentous historic
events – accession to NATO and, five years later, the
European Union – with a feeling of satisfaction, together-
ness and seriousness of purpose, but also solemnity.
The reason for these conflicted feelings is the state of
Alliance itself. The problems are too numerous to list here,
and have in any case been analysed in a number of excellent
studies recently published in Europe and the US. For us, the
most important are differences in threat perception and,
consequently, rifts over strategic priorities, including
territorial defence versus out-of-area missions, and the
strength of Article V commitments. Poland and its regional
allies anxiously anticipate the consequences of allied tension
related to the growing globalisation of NATO activities.
Even if it is considered self-evident that Poland and
many other members of the Alliance do not have global
interests, we all, as NATO members, share not only region-
al but also global security responsibilities – a point stressed
by Mr. Bogdan Klich, the Polish Minister of National
Defence.
During the recent Security Conference in Munich, Pre-
sident Nicolas Sarkozy asked, ‘Does Europe want peace or
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does it want to be left in peace?’ The Polish response is that
in order to safeguard the peace, including peace in Europe,
we cannot remain uninvolved in ‘far-away countries we
know little about’. There was a joke in the ‘bad old days’:
Visit the Soviet Union before the Soviet Union visits you.
We must now visit sources of real danger, wisely and in
solidarity, before the dangers visit us.
For these reasons, we anxiously await a New Strategic
Concept that will address the balance between NATO’s
traditional defence commitments in the Euro-Atlantic area
and other important issues, such as out-of-area missions,
new challenges, future enlargement, burden-sharing and so
on. Muddling through is not an option. Unfortunately,
given the diversity of perspectives and priorities among
member states, it seems to be a real possibility. We here do
not like it.
During the conference, Polish Prime Minister Donald
Tusk stated: ‘Poland will invest its hopes and dreams, as
well as its real and material capabilities, in the strength and
might of the North Atlantic Alliance’. His statement
reflects the convictions of a great majority of Poles. We
do not doubt the need for NATO in the future. Our
conference was thus convened in the hope that our allies
and NATO partners will engage in a value-based but
pragmatic and purposeful debate on:
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Donald Tusk
Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland
Mr. Secretary General,
Dear Friends of Poland, and of many of us
– also on a personal level,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Anniversaries are a good time for meetings, speeches
and presentations, but an occasion such as the tenth
anniversary of Poland’s NATO accession is also the right
moment for an in-depth, political reflection about Poland’s
participation in the North Atlantic Alliance, and about the
very essence of the Alliance in the context of the history of
our state and nation. We had the occasion yesterday and
today, as well as during these last ten years, to speak
extensively about the technical, military and logistical
aspects of NATO functioning.
I would like to use this occasion to say a few words about
the Alliance’s axiological foundations as well as our mem-
bership. When Poland joined NATO ten years ago, ours
was a country that had experienced dramatic events, and by
this I mean the entire twentieth century. Our experiences –
both the tragic and optimistic ones – from the 1980–81 and
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1989 periods taught us one thing: that only a practical and
fundamentally sound solidarity can guarantee Polish secu-
rity and global order. We often speak of solidarity, but not
only due to our national sentiment vis-a`-vis this expression.
I am convinced that NATO would lose its purpose without
solidarity, which remains a key value for all the countries
united within the Alliance.
What is Article V of the Washington Treaty, if not the
epitome of this ideal, which became so important for Poles,
which constituted both the essence and condition of our
climb to independence? But this crucial value in terms of
the Alliance – solidarity understood in a rather old-
fashioned way, in its most simple definition, the way people
understand it, meaning one for all, and all for one – this
solidarity failed in the twentieth century, outflanked by
egoism. Today, we bear witness to, and sometimes parti-
cipate in, this great struggle between egoism and solidarity.
If in the North Atlantic Alliance, but also more broadly in
our entire civilisation, this ideal of solidarity shall triumph
over egoism, then we will remain calm about the united
future of states and nations. The extremely dramatic history
of the twentieth century shows, however, that the urge to
escape into egoism – and I emphasise escape into egoism,
because egoism has its roots in cowardliness – this history
shows that in petty, weak leadership, in unfavourable
circumstances, in the fall of this axiology shared by NATO
states, the threat of escape into egoism and cowardliness is
always present. That is why we must bear in mind that this
Alliance, this defensive Alliance, must remember the su-
preme value of solidarity in defence of everyone, regardless
of their potential.
There is also a second issue, which we Poles remember
very well. The issue that initially led to the very creation of
NATO – CHALLENGES AND TASKS AHEAD
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NATO. Today, we are witness to a completely different
geopolitical context. The Cold War days are over. Gone are
the days of the confrontation between the Communist
system and the free world. But only a naive person, some-
one without a knowledge of history, could claim that the
optimism expressed by some parties, an optimism which
speaks of the end of history, can find its application in the
domain of security. I would like to emphasise that those
values for which Poles had so longed, in the name of which
Poles endeavoured to access the European Union and
NATO, are not only applicable, not only of topical interest,
but also require constant alertness, constant engagement.
These are the most traditional values. This may not be
a breakthrough discovery, but it is really worth repeating
these truths every day, especially when we see that some
people have already proclaimed their demise. Here, I mean
values typical for each and every liberal democracy: human
freedoms, the value of individualism, free market and open
competition, respect for the most traditional values, the
very essence of our civilization. The North Atlantic
Alliance, both when it was created and now, must be a gua-
rantee of the security and strength of the civilisation and
community that has grown out of these values.
Deeply believing in the sense of these axiological
foundations, Poland and other new NATO states, unlike
during the first years of our NATO existence, no longer
wish to be countries that can only count on the help of
others. Our capabilities are still not the ones we dream
about, not yet comparable with the biggest powers that
constitute the pillars of the North Atlantic Alliance. But
perhaps because of our painful experiences, we want to be
active partners, in the sense of being useful for global order
and global security. We are ready to help others, and not
Donald Tusk
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only wait for help should – knock on wood – it ever be
necessary.
This is why Poland supports a strong political leadership
in NATO and supports the enlargement of NATO towards
those countries and states in which the aforementioned
axiology is also very much alive, or is at least becoming the
political wish for these nations’ and states’ authorities. This
is why we support and participate in even the most de-
manding NATO missions, staying true to the old Polish cri
de coeur: ‘For our freedom and yours.’ When Poles
proclaimed this motto, they didn’t have their own country.
When someone brandishing a sabre calls out ‘for our
freedom and yours’, he may become the object of ridicule
on the part of the strongest forces. But when this motto –
which in its deepest sense expresses the essence of solidarity
standing in defence of the most crucial values – becomes
the motto of a strong Alliance, it can become the source of
a real, true hope for the entire world. I am convinced that
both today and in future, Poland will invest its hopes and
dreams, as well as its real and material capabilities, in the
strength and might of the North Atlantic Alliance. We are
here today partly in order to say these words to each other
and repeat them.
I am proud to be the head of the Polish government at
a time when we celebrate this proud and important
anniversary.
Thank you very much.
NATO – CHALLENGES AND TASKS AHEAD
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Jaap de Hoop Scheffer
NATO Secretary General
Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
I am both very pleased and deeply honoured to be here
with Prime Minister Tusk speaking at this 10th Anniversary
Conference on the challenges faced by NATO. Let me
thank Minister Klich for having invited me. And let me also
congratulate Poland and the Polish people most sincerely
with their ten years in NATO. It is a very important day
indeed. When Poland joined the Alliance back in 1999,
Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek promised that Poland
would be, I quote, ‘a good and credible ally, for good and
bad weather’. And I think there is no doubt that your
country has more than lived up to that promise by one of
the key political figures in its recent history.
Ten years of NATO membership is, I think, an excellent
opportunity to look back and to reflect upon years gone by.
But it is also a good opportunity to draw some lessons for
the future. After all, NATO’s enlargement, as Prime Minis-
ter Tusk said a moment ago, is an ongoing process. Seven
more countries have become members of NATO since
Poland joined together with the Czech Republic and
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Hungary ten years ago. Two countries are about to enter.
And we know that several more wish to follow in their
footsteps. We owe it to all interested countries – whether
now or in the future – to share your experience and to help
them prepare for membership.
I know that the term ‘historic’ is used too often perhaps
nowadays. Yet the significance of what happened on
12 March 1999 can hardly be overstated. On that day,
when Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary formally
acceded into NATO, the Cold War ended for good, and
justice triumphed over history. It was an overwhelming
demonstration of the right of any European nation to
determine its own fate, by its own free choice. And it was
a huge step towards the free, undivided and democratic
Europe to which NATO had aspired from its very begin-
ning, now almost sixty years ago.
The accession of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hun-
gary was important for these three nations themselves,
important for NATO and important for Europe as a whole.
For the three new members, it marked the return to
Europe from which they had been forcefully separated.
NATO membership gave you a seat at the table where key
decisions are taken to shape our strategic environment. It
gave you Allies with whom to share the common burden of
security. And, of course, Prime Minister Tusk indeed as you
have said, it did give you the ultimate security guarantee of
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, and the assurance that
Allies would come to your assistance if you ever came
under attack.
For NATO, the accession of Poland, the Czech Republic
and Hungary marked another step in its post-Cold War
adaptation, with three new members adding new military
and political weight to shape the strategic environment in
NATO – CHALLENGES AND TASKS AHEAD
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a positive way. And for Europe, it marked both the end of
its erstwhile division and a new beginning – at the threshold
of the 21st century, because the old continent was finally
able to leave its tragic past behind.
Over the subsequent few years, the accession of Poland,
the Czech Republic and Hungary proved wrong all those
who feared that enlargement could be a net loss for Euro-
pean security. It proved wrong all those who saw enlar-
gement as the creation of a new division. And it proved
wrong all those who maintained that it would undermine
NATO’s cohesion and effectiveness, or that it would force
the new members to devote too much of their scarce
resources to defence.
None of these predictions came true. Thanks to NATO’s
enlargement and partnership policies, alongside those of
the European Union, our continent has never been more
stable and more secure. And the prospect of membership
into these two key institutions remains a major incentive for
nations all across Europe to get their house in order,
introduce difficult but necessary reforms, and pursue good
neighbourly relations.
NATO’s cohesion and effectiveness have not been
affected, either. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland
have all integrated smoothly. They have made their voices
heard, and are still making their voices heard, of course.
But they have also displayed the same team spirit as all
other Allies, and contributed to the consensus-decision-
making which underpins our Alliance. More than that, they
have become important and valued contributors to
NATO’s operations and missions : today Poland has almost
1600 soldiers in ISAF – and I will go to Ghazni province
and visit your fellow countrymen next week – with another
285 in KFOR.
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer
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The costs of NATO membership have also remained
modest. We acknowledged that they would not be trivial,
but that they could be stretched over a longer period of
time. We said that the necessary military reforms of our
three new Allies would need to be ambitious, and that they
should continue after their accession. And we said that,
while our new Allies would naturally have to make their
contribution, the benefits that NATO membership would
bring would be very much greater. And that was borne out
by the facts. And today, while the global financial crisis
leaves none of the Allies unaffected, NATO membership
continues to offer us all excellent value for money.
Of course, back in 1999, some nations were disappointed
to be left out of this first round of enlargement. But none
gave up its ambition to join NATO – and seven more were
admitted just a few years later. At the beginning of 2004, as
one of my first official acts as NATO Secretary General,
I had the privilege to communicate to them our invitation
to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. And I have warm
memories of the accession ceremony in Washington D.C. in
March of that year.
Now, in a few weeks’ time, at NATO’s 60th Anniversary
Summit, in Strasbourg and Kehl, in the heart of Europe,
I hope that two more nations will be joining our Alliance –
I say two because it is my strong hope that both Albania
and Croatia will be with us as full members for this great
celebratory moment. We have made clear repeatedly – and
no doubt will do so again at our next Summit – that
NATO’s door remains open for future members. And
interested countries, like everyone else, know that we mean
what we say.
In retrospect, then, NATO enlargement has proved the
doom-sayers to be totally wrong. Enlargement has not
NATO – CHALLENGES AND TASKS AHEAD
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fallen victim to a zero-sum logic. NATO members have
managed the process well. And it has been a very clear
benefit for European security.
Still, although NATO enlargement has been very succes-
sful thus far, we must constantly remind ourselves that it is
not an end in itself. It is a means to an end. And that end is
to safeguard our security in a rapidly changing world. Now,
if we take this aim seriously, then we must not rest on our
laurels, but move on. In fact, as someone once pointed out
to me, he who can rest on his laurels probably wears them
in the wrong place!
So what are the challenges ahead? What must an enlarg-
ed NATO do in order to safeguard our security and our
freedom in today’s world? To my mind, three major chal-
lenges stand out:
The first are our operations and missions. We have al-
ways said that countries that join NATO must not be mere
consumers of security, but providers of security. With
almost 300 soldiers supporting the NATO mission in Ko-
sovo and 1600 in Afghanistan, Poland is making a signifi-
cant, I would say very significant, and very welcome
contribution to our common effort. I am confident that
your country will continue to demonstrate that same com-
mitment, especially in Afghanistan where the stakes are
particularly high, as we all know.
We must ensure that we have sufficient troops and
enablers on the ground to ensure security, both during and
after the coming election period. As an Alliance, we have
had considerable success in training and equipping the
Afghan National Army, and we must build on that progress.
And while NATO, of course, alone cannot take sole res-
ponsibility we must look at how we can contribute to greater
assistance in building up the ANP. But there is a lot more
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer
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that we – and the international community as a whole – can
do, and should do, on the civilian side as well – in helping the
Afghans to build functioning institutions, to fight crime and
corruption, and get a better grip of the narcotics problem.
And of course Ladies and Gentlemen, we need to look
beyond Afghanistan. We must take into account the wider
region, and especially Pakistan, with which we must deepen
our engagement. We must also get our military and civilian
institutions to co-operate much more closely and more
effectively in a truly Comprehensive Approach. And I hope
that we will be able to make progress in all these areas at
the big Afghanistan conference in the Netherlands on the
31st March, as Hillary Clinton termed it, the so-called ‘Big
Tent’ meeting.
For while we are helping the people of Afghanistan, we
are also fighting at the frontline of terrorism. Ladies and
Gentlemen, I am aware that Defence Minister Klich and
Prime Minister Tusk have to defend Polish participation in
Afghanistan, often in the face of very critical public opi-
nion, but let’s be clear, the stakes are high and failure is not
an option.
The second major challenge facing our Alliance is our
relationship with Russia. When NATO started its enlarge-
ment process in the 1990s, there were fears that we would
alienate Russia. Indeed, there were Russian concerns about
what enlargement would mean for them. Where we judged
these concerns to be legitimate, we sought to address them.
Where we felt them to be inappropriate, we made it clear
that the future of Europe could not be held hostage to
outmoded concepts of ’spheres of influence’. On balance,
this approach worked. Within five years NATO grew from
16 to 26 members, and we still managed to deepen our
relationship with Russia.
NATO – CHALLENGES AND TASKS AHEAD
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However, the conflict in Georgia last August led some
observers to believe that our dual strategy of pursuing
enlargement and simultaneously engaging Russia had run
its course. Some even said that enlargement had turned
from being the solution to being part of the problem of
Europe’s security. So has a success story ended? I don’t
think so. NATO’s enlargement process remains part and
parcel of our strategy of consolidating Europe as an
undivided and democratic security space.
At the same time, it is clear that the NATO-Russia
relationship is too valuable to be stuck in arguments only
on issues which divide us. Afghanistan is one key area
where we have obvious common interests, but there are
other areas as well, such as the fight against terrorism and
piracy, and the need to counter the proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction. NATO and Russia need
a trustful partnership that encourages dialogue on all issues
– not just those where we agree but also those where we
disagree – with a view towards resolving problems and
building practical cooperation. And that is why NATO
Foreign Ministers agreed last week to the reconvening of
formal NATO-Russia Council meetings, including at
Ministerial level, as soon as possible before the Summer.
Does that mean we suddenly agree with Russia on a range
of difficult issues? No, but not talking is not an option. This
is an important partnership and we must see where we
agree and disagree and engage in a dialogue which
addresses those issues of difference.
The third major challenge for NATO is to define its
approach to new risks and threats. NATO’s enlargement
process began when the term ‘globalisation’ applied mainly
to economic developments. Today, challenges to our
security have also globalised. We have seen these past few
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer
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years that cyber attacks or the interruption of energy
supplies can devastate a country without a single shot being
fired. We are witnessing the return of piracy as a serious,
global security challenge. At the same time, Iran’s nuclear
programme continues to highlight the pressing challenge of
the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
We need to better define NATO’s role in meeting these
challenges. NATO may not provide all the answers, but that
should not serve as excuse for inaction. We must make the
best possible use of the Alliance’s unique value as a forum
for transatlantic political dialogue, and as an instrument for
translating political decisions into concrete action. After all,
threats don’t wait until we feel that we are ready for them.
At our Summit next month we must show that the
NATO Allies are able to muster the necessary political will,
imagination and solidarity to meet these challenges. And
I am confident that we shall. But the Summit must do even
more. With a new US Administration settling in office, and
with the prospect of France taking its full place in NATO’s
integrated military structures – this is good news, excellent
news. So the Summit is also the perfect moment to launch
work on a new Strategic Concept for NATO.
Such a new Strategic Concept will need to combine the
Alliance’s core purpose, and let’s never forget it, of col-
lective defence with the many requirements associated with
out-of-area operations. It will need to emphasise NATO’s
role as a unique community of common values and
interests. It will need to make clear NATO’s strong desire
to engage with the UN, the EU and other international
actors, as partners, in a comprehensive approach to the
security challenges of our time. And it should also under-
line, just as our current Strategic Concept does, that NATO
will keep its door open for new members.
NATO – CHALLENGES AND TASKS AHEAD
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Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,
If the history of the 20th century has told us anything, it is
that the costs of indifference and neglect are ultimately
going to be much greater than cost of investing in a strong,
effective Alliance. Over the past ten years, NATO enlarge-
ment has helped your country – Poland and nine others
countries in Central and Eastern Europe back onto the
political map. Never again will you be the object of
someone else’s ambitions. Today, there are several other
nations who share this same, very legitimate, aspiration –
and others may follow in the future. Your country, and our
Alliance, must remain a shining beacon for them. And I am
sure that we will. So, finally let me thank Prime Minister
Tusk once again, for being here and for Poland’s
contribution as such a committed, staunch member of the
Alliance. That commitment is essential if we are to defend
hard won freedoms and values. I realise today that I am
preaching to the ‘converted’ audience, but we also need to
reach out to the successor generation and you are well
placed to do that: while I was fortunate enough to be born
on the ‘right side’ of the Iron Curtain, you have fought for
your freedom and know the values we all enjoy today had to
be fought for and that they don’t come automatically, that
a free world has to be defended. Our successor generation
must know too, the importance of defending those values
and the key role that NATO plays in that.
Thank you.
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer
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Bogdan Klich
Poland’s Minister of National Defence
A STRONG ALLIANCE
It is my great pleasure to deliver a this address at such
a distinguished conference. The background for our discus-
sions today has an exceptional symbolic meaning. We
celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Polish membership in
the Alliance and, almost at the same time, the sixtieth of
signing the Washington Treaty. These commemorations
provide us with a unique opportunity not only to summarise
past NATO achievements, but to set new, ambitious goals for
its future as well. Prior to the summit in Strasbourg and Kehl,
which will take place in three weeks time, such discussions
are of particular importance. This high-level meeting will not
end the process of transformation and adaptation that
NATO has undertaken in recent years. On the contrary,
commencing work on a new strategic concept will trigger new
perspectives for the Alliance in the twenty-first century.
In regard to the key topic of this session: The Strong
Alliance, let me emphasise that this is an issue widely and
intensively discussed in Poland. The matter strongly stimu-
lates the work of experts from various academic institutions
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and think tanks across the country. The obvious reason for
this is that Poland has become an active NATO member
and takes its membership obligations seriously.
It has already been ten years since Poland joined NATO.
We have to state that on the whole the last decade should
be described as clearly positive. Polls show public opinion
agrees, recognising accession to the Alliance as a success
story.
Membership in NATO has significantly enhanced
Poland’s security. The most important ‘defensive umbrella’
over our heads is Article 5. Close relations with the United
States are also fundamental for our security. And yet
another foundation is the development of European
Security and Defence Policy within the European Union.
These are the essential building blocks of our security.
The security guarantee of Article 5 is not the only
advantage of membership. Joining NATO has greatly
increased our international role. It is now possible for Po-
land to influence stabilisation efforts directly across our
borders and beyond, both of which are key for the security
and stabilisation of the Euro-Atlantic sphere as a whole.
Moreover, it has been a milestone in the adaptation of
the Polish Armed Forces to the military standards and
requirements of the twenty-first century. These changes
were obviously in line with our membership aspirations and
developing co-operation with NATO. As a result, our for-
ces are smaller but more capable. They use modern military
equipment and weapons. Hence they are able to add signi-
ficant value to NATO efforts, both in transformational and
operational dimensions.
Ten years on, NATO remains central to our security.
Poland’s policy is to keep the Alliance strong and vital. To
this end, there are a few points I would like to make in
NATO – CHALLENGES AND TASKS AHEAD
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regard to our expectations of NATO and its future deve-
lopment.
Firstly, we believe that while developing expeditionary
capabilities and conducting operations far from Euro-
Atlantic territory, collective defence should remain the
core NATO function. This was emphasised earlier today by
the Prime Minister and the Secretary General. In a nut-
shell, the more defence mechanisms and instruments in
NATO security policy, the better the guarantees for every
member state. In other words, a balance must be struck
within the Alliance between new tasks and missions on one
hand, and the traditional functions related to collective
defence on the other. A few areas are of particular impor-
tance in this context.
Reinforcing a key transformational initiative, NATO
Response Force, is one of them. We need to make sure that
NRF, introduced 7 years ago at the NATO ministerial
meeting here in Warsaw, is not a ‘paper tiger’ but a credible
instrument. NRF is to be used for expeditionary missions as
well as for strengthening member states should they be
threatened with invasion. We need solutions that will
enable NRF to be fully effective in these tasks. Moreover,
NATO should maintain and develop the operational plans
that identify troops for reinforcement of allies in the event
of Article 5 threats. While joining NATO, Poland
successfully aspired to develop such mechanisms for itself.
Facing dynamic changes in the security environment, these
plans obviously have to be updated on an automatic and
regular basis. Common exercises should also more fre-
quently reflect traditional threats related to Article 5
scenarios.
Last but not least, and of which Poland needs not be
often reminded, is the issue of the equal distribution of
Bogdan Klich
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NATO installations among the allies. There were two
waves of enlargement in the last ten years. The current
geographic range of the Alliance is different now than in
the 1990s. These changes must be reflected in the deve-
lopment of NATO’s structures and military infrastructure.
Hosting such elements on the territory of the newer mem-
bers is crucial for the cohesion and effectiveness of the
Alliance. It more deeply anchors those nations to NATO’s
structure, as well as increases their ability to contribute to
the Alliance’s operation and development.
The second key expectation is for NATO to remain a forum
of dialogue and co-operation between countries on both sides
of the Atlantic. The transatlantic link is a core principle of the
Washington Treaty. In the current security environment, its
strength is a prerequisite for the effective achievement of
common goals and defence of common values.
Nowadays it seems to be much easier to look for mutually
beneficial solutions than a few years ago. The climate on
both sides of the ocean has truly improved. The US seems to
be willing to develop and enhance its partnership with
Europe. Likewise, Europe is more inclined to consider an
American perspective on security issues.
We have to take advantage of this opportunity to deepen
transatlantic dialogue. It is high time to establish new
practical modalities for co-operation between NATO and
the EU. Afghanistan and Kosovo have demonstrated we
should not only be able to make full use of Berlin Plus
arrangements, but to go beyond them in terms of both
planning and co-operation. If we do not manage to resolve
such issues, we will fail. And by ‘we’ I mean neither NATO
nor the EU, but rather the whole Euro-Atlantic community.
A third issue is our need to intensify activities in
Afghanistan, as it poses a real test for NATO’s credibility.
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Failure is not an option, as stressed today by the Secretary
General. The endeavour undertaken a few years ago has
to be completed successfully. The Afghan population is
counting on the establishment of stability and security in their
country. We must also succeed for the sake of our own
security, in order to tackle threats before they knock directly
and unexpectedly at our doors. Our performance will be
a clear indicator of our ability to deal with challenges far
from our borders, to mobilise the appropriate forces, and to
combine military involvement with civilian efforts. It will also
emphasise our solidarity in addressing shared burdens.
For these reasons Poland approaches the ISAF very
seriously. Last year we increased our contingent from 1200
to 1600 troops and took over the Ghazni province in order
to fully optimise our efforts there. We are also aware that
we will face new challenges related to the nation’s
presidential elections this year. That is why I have under-
taken important decisions. In April and May, the fifth
rotation of our contingent will be comprised of more
combat troops and fewer logistics and support elements. It
will also be reinforced with additional troops and
helicopters. We are intensifying our development assis-
tance. Training the Afghan army and helping Afghan police
are high on our agenda. We are also co-operating vigo-
rously with local authorities. All such activities promote the
good reputation of Polish forces, bolster our efforts in
Afghanistan, and are widely appreciated by the local
community. This is not only my opinion. One of the articles
published a few days ago in The Guardian recognises our
endeavours and their positive impact on the country.
Fourthly, the Alliance needs to respond to the new, less
traditional threats and challenges that have emerged in the
last twenty years. Although often not of a military nature,
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they may have far-reaching security implications for
member states. For this reason, even if NATO is not the
appropriate organisation to comprehensively address them
all, it obviously has a role to play. The protection of critical
energy infrastructure is just one example. The development
of mechanisms to defend against cyberattacks, such as
those in Estonia, is another.
A fifth issue is that of Ukraine and Georgia. I am glad
the Secretary General had an opportunity to explain the
future of the ‘open door’ policy when answering a par-
ticipant’s question. We are traditionally strong proponents
of the ‘open door’ policy. It is in our interest that the door
to NATO is not closed. The policy clearly enhanced the
stability of NATO territory and its environs during the
1990s, as it has at the dawn of this century. In our
experience, the policy encourages the development of
democratic and free market institutions within prospective
member nations. We are glad that two more states –
Albania and Croatia are joining NATO in three weeks. This
should not, however, mark the end of the enlargement
process. The ‘open door’ policy has to be confirmed,
particularly in regard to Ukraine and Georgia.
I recall a conference seventeen years ago on Ukrainian-
Polish co-operation, at which the ambassador of Ukraine to
Poland, Mr. Hennadij Udovenko, made an important
statement in reference to the idea of Jerzy Giedroyc,
founding father of the prominent Parisian periodical
‘Kultura’ (Culture). The ambassador’s statement was:
‘There is no secure Poland without a secure Ukraine.’ This
is, in fact, the essence of Poland’s advocacy for Kiev’s
aspirations to integrate with Euro-Atlantic institutions.
We are, therefore, anticipating compliance with the
agreements made last year at the Bucharest summit and
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elaborated upon at NATO’s foreign ministers’ meeting last
December. These decisions are obviously a coherent
package. They provide us with a set of practical initiatives
to stimulate and assist Kiev and Tbilisi in their political and
defence reforms. We should approach this possibility in
good faith, ready to invite these two states to MAP, and
eventually membership, once they are willing and prepared.
Lastly, I would like to address NATO-Russia relations.
No doubt, Moscow has the potential to be a valuable
partner. There are many areas where we need Russia’s
hand – Afghanistan is a good example. Nevertheless, the
relationship has many outstanding issues, put in stark relief
in August last year. By infringing upon the independent and
sovereign territory of Georgia, Russia lost the trust of
NATO members, which had taken years to achieve.
As far as Poland is concerned, we are interested in
having a credible and trustworthy partner close to our
borders. We support co-operation and are open to dis-
cussions with Russia, even on issues on which we can hardly
agree. I fully concur here with the Secretary General that
we must work out a realistic formula of dialogue and co-
operation. At the same time, we have to remember that
good and fruitful relations with Moscow cannot be
achieved at the expense of the values and principles that
have confirmed NATO’s vitality for the past sixty years. We
cannot turn a blind eye to aggression or attempts to
establish any sphere of influence.
In conclusion, let me note that these issues will be
reiterated at the forthcoming summit in Strasbourg and
Kehl. I do hope that the meeting will confirm that despite
its age of sixty years, the Alliance remains strong, vital and
relevant. The message of the summit should be clear and
unambiguous: NATO is capable of transforming itself in
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adaptation to the threats and challenges it will face in the
twenty-first century. I am sure that the Declaration on
Alliance Security will be put to good use and not only
because professor Adam Rotfeld, the former Polish foreign
minister, was one of the ‘wise men’ who drafted it. I am
mainly sure because it establishes a process by which a new
strategic concept will be adopted at the next NATO summit
hopefully in 2010.
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Radosław Sikorski
Poland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs
Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,
I am honoured to have the opportunity to address such
a distinguished audience. Let me thank the Ministry of
National Defence and the Centre for International Rela-
tions for organising this event.
This conference takes place at a very significant moment
for Poland. The year 2009 marks the tenth anniversary of
Poland’s accession to NATO. It was one of the most
important political events in our modern history. The year
1999 was a milestone for Poland in building our citizens’
security awareness and their trust in the state. Our accession
coincided with the tenth anniversary of the autumn of 1989,
which transformed the socio-political system of Poland and
rebalanced first the whole European continent, and then
the world order. Joining NATO was proof that the strategic
path chosen ten years earlier was the right one. NATO is the
key pillar in Polish security policy.
Since its inception, NATO has undergone profound
changes that have shaped the Alliance as we know it today.
Since 1949, membership has increased from 12 to 26 coun-
tries through five rounds of enlargement. Last year, the
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invitation to NATO was extended to Albania and Croatia,
which are to sign the accession protocols next month. We
also trust that Macedonia will be able to see its membership
in NATO in the near future.
Poland strongly supports the Alliance’s open door policy.
We continue to believe that the best stabilisation instru-
ment for the Euro-Atlantic community is the enlargement
policy. Our work to formulate the Alliance’s course of
action towards an enhanced open door policy will continue,
as we believe all democracies have the right to choose their
relationship with NATO freely.
Over the last 20 years, the Alliance has gone through
a fundamental change – a transformation from a Cold War
western military Alliance into a political-military organisa-
tion that constitutes a forum of dialogue and co-operation
with numerous partners both in Europe and beyond. Since
the London Declaration of 1990, we have witnessed the
Alliance’s rapid evolution. As a result, its current role
extends beyond the original responsibility of territorial
defence against an external threat. Apart from satisfying
this primary obligation, the Alliance began to play an
important stabilising role on a global scale. The progressive
liberation of this new mindset from the geopolitical
thinking of the Cold War era has been a work in progress.
Most likely it will take an additional generation or two until
this new, non-confrontational approach is entirely compre-
hended and appreciated.
It was not only the end of the Cold War that so soundly
affected the mindset of the Alliance, although it did play
a key role in changing the world’s geopolitical architecture
and, thus, NATO policies. No less important were changes
in the security environment that soon became 21st century
challenges.
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The spring of the new millennium brought a tremendous
challenge, as new, ‘asymmetric’ threats appeared on the
international stage that affect us all, regardless of our
location on the world map or state policies. The threat of
terrorism, including religious extremism, the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, energy security abuses and
environmental issues, all constitute threats that the
Alliance has to confront today. In order to effectively
ensure transatlantic security, the Alliance has launched the
idea of a transformation process, both in political and
military terms. I hope we will take action on NATO’s new
Strategic Concept, which is to be launched at the
Strassbourg/Khel Summit just around the corner.
The key element that arises in discussions on the future
role of NATO is as a Euro-Atlantic security provider, both
in terms of Article V of the Treaty of Washington as well as
the Alliance’s expeditionary operations. Some may think
that these two values are irreconcilable. Let me be clear
that it is just the opposite. Expeditionary operations, with
the ISAF mission in Afghanistan serving as the best
example, prove that NATO is capable of defending its
core values and adapting to the challenges of the 21st
century.
This has set the ground for today’s discussions on the
core duties of the Alliance today. The new responsibilities
defined for NATO should not detract from the core role it
has played in the Euro-Atlantic community. In accordance
with the Treaty of 1949, NATO’s fundamental role is to
‘safeguard the freedom and security of its member
countries by political and military means.’ It is believed in
our part of Europe that maintaining NATO’s capability to
defend its members and address traditional challenges
should not be neglected when developing new capabilities.
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The mission in Afghanistan has proven NATO’s ability
to adjust to dynamic security challenges and respond to new
threats while remaining committed to Article V obligations.
It has further demonstrated how, in the new security
environment, we may be forced to defend ourselves far
beyond our borders. These two functions need not clash.
On the contrary, Article V defence obligations and ‘out-of-
area’ missions complement each other.
The Polish presence in Afghanistan best underlines our
national commitment to both Article V and expeditionary
operations as important for the security of our state, our
continent and the whole transatlantic community. For this
reason, our engagement in Afghanistan will remain vital.
With 1600 troops currently deployed, Poland wants to
contribute to the stabilisation and reconstruction of
Afghanistan. We trust to be able to satisfy the expectations
of our Afghan and transatlantic partners in the Ghazni
province, where our troops are performing their duties.
Afghanistan will remain the number one NATO
operational priority for the foreseeable future. It requires
deep commitment, strong co-operation and continued
effort to achieve the objectives set out at its beginning.
However, the engagement in Afghanistan is not merely
a military battle with boots on the ground, but a multi-
dimensional endeavour requiring solid, civil-military co-
operation. It is important to admit that the Alliance of
today plays a role of not only extinguishing the fire, but also
creating the conditions needed to prevent a repeated inter-
vention. Known as a comprehensive approach, this vision
for the ISAF operation is being successfully implemented in
Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, today’s NATO is not only about remote
operations. There is still unfinished business in Europe,
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including the operation in Kosovo and the NATO-EU
operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Berlin Plus
operation). NATO support in the Balkans is necessary if
the region is to take its rightful place in the Euro-Atlantic
community. Operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Bosnia
and Herzegovina have further illustrated the importance of
co-operation between NATO and the EU. A solid partner-
ship between the two constitutes a warranty for trans-
atlantic security. They have both been instrumental in the
post-Cold War reconstruction of Europe, and share
fundamental strategic interests in the present security
environment. As such, it is essential for these organizations
to forge a genuine partnership that will deter threats. To do
so will also ensure the successful fulfilment of the terms of
the ‘comprehensive approach’, which can be implemented
by means of achieving stabilization objectives (such as those
in Afghanistan) in close co-operation with other organiza-
tions, such as, among others, the EU and the UN.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
The Strategic Concept of 1999 recognised the importance
of maintaining an open dialogue with Ukraine, Russia and
the Mediterranean countries, the continued process of
enlargement, the problems of nuclear proliferation, and
a commitment to conflict prevention and crisis manage-
ment. Since 1999, it has been argued that several events
have critically affected the reality we live in. Those events
include September 11th, the proliferation of terrorism, the
wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq, and terrorist attacks in
London, Madrid, Mumbai and Islamabad. Adapting to the
challenges of the new environment has not been easy, nor
will be the negotiation process to reflect them in the New
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Strategic Concept, especially for a consensus-based organi-
zation like NATO. Yet, it is feasible.
The work on the New Strategic Concept and its conclu-
sion will be pivotal for the future of the organisation in the
21st century, both in symbolic and functional terms.
A resolute review will be needed in order to prepare guide-
lines that will address the vital needs of the organisation for
the years to come. We believe the upcoming summit will
provide solid direction in this respect. Poland is aware of its
role in this task, and intends to act vigorously towards de-
veloping a new doctrine.
Since the last summit in Bucharest, a lot has happened to
prove that there is a need, and room, for adjustments.
The political and military crisis in Georgia, the energy crisis
in Ukraine and developments in the Balkans, among
others, have set the groundwork for discussion on how
NATO can perform effectively in the decades to come.
Consequently, in a new document, we need to not only
address terrorism and WMD proliferation, but also such
issues as energy security, climate change and cyber-attacks.
These challenges require the Alliance’s collective transfor-
mation and response.
The question we need to ask ourselves is not whether
NATO is still relevant, but what else should be done
in order to render it more effective in addressing the
security challenges of the 21st century. The military trans-
formation of the Alliance will be significant in this regard,
even though not all of the challenges will require military
answers. We need to have deployable and efficient forces
capable of successfully responding to crises both near and
far.
For these reasons, the April summit be a principal event
in the public debate concerning security challenges, trans-
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formation and enlargement – all essential to guarantee the
transatlantic community’s future security.
Let me conclude by saying that since Poland’s accession
to NATO, we have never taken our membership for
granted. Throughout the last ten years we have confirmed,
on many occasions, our conviction that the Alliance is
a major factor in the defence and political stability of
Europe and an essential provider of our own security, as
well as our ability to stand up to the challenges of not only
being a member, but also of being a trustworthy and
committed partner, for better and worse. We will continue
to contribute to NATO policies and actively participate in
their implementation while enhancing the transatlantic
partnership.
Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,
I would like to reply to the words of Mr. Secretary
General in his opening speech in Krako´w three weeks ago.
Mr. Secretary General, you can be assured that the ‘allied
solidarity’ you called for in Krako´w can be found in this
country, where the notion of ‘solidarity’ is known better
than elsewhere. I am convinced that allied solidarity for
a purposeful cause will be a new breath for the future
of our good, old NATO.
Thank you.
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Dr Adam Kobieracki*
WHAT DOES POLAND EXPECT FROM NATO?
Historical background
Allow me to start with the obvious: reflected herein are
my personal opinions and do not constitute any official
position. I say this not to be politically correct. Rather, it
allows for what I personally want to express under the
above-stated title. It has to be stressed, as I am a Polish
diplomat, a former NATO official and at time consider
myself an expert on security policy.
As a Pole, I also have to be clear from the outset that
although there are different categories of Polish expectations
vis-a`-vis NATO (to which we will come later), there is also an
almost sentimental attitude towards NATO shared by most
of my compatriots for mainly historic reasons. It is that we
expect our membership in the North Atlantic Alliance to
serve as confirmation of Poland’s inclusion in Europe and its
affiliation with Western European values and standards. In
Ambassador, currently Director of the International Security Policy
Department in the Polish MFA, former NATO Assistant Secretary
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a sense, we expect NATO to serve as yet another symbol of
Poland’s independence, sovereignty and freedom of choice
after the dark years of our 20th century history.
This attitude is one reason for the Polish tendency to
think twice about any fundamental change in the way
NATO functions rather than rush into implementation.
When you finally board a train of which you have long
dreamt, you tend to sit back and enjoy the ride for a while.
We are not necessarily conservative in regard to change, we
simply do not want to be deprived of a newly acquired
membership in a rather prestigious club, or to see pre-
viously forbidden fruit evolving into something quite
different.
With such a perspective, we are prepared to undertake
NATO’s necessary transformation, but only for good rea-
son, in an appropriate direction, and not at any cost. NATO
is too important for us, so we are reluctant to risk its
gradual erosion with hasty action.
For Poles, NATO’s transformation is understood as
necessary for adaptation to new politico-military realities
and a changing security environment. Adaptation, however,
consists of improvements in efficiency and organisation; it
does not imply a total redefinition of NATO’s raison d’eˆtre
– namely, collective defence, common values and a more
secure world.
NATO’s Role in the Defence of Poland
Ten years ago, when we were joining the club, there was
a widespread belief in Poland that NATO would be a pa-
nacea for all our security problems and a shield against all
security threats and challenges. Apart from the obvious joy
of self-determination, such an expectation was the main
reason for the unusually high level of public support for
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Polish membership in the Alliance. It is worth noting,
however, that in the late 1990s, popular wisdom held that
Poland required defence mainly, if not exclusively, from
military threats coming from the East, in the classic sense of
that terminology.
Allow me to be blunt here: the only external threat of
which Poles were really afraid at that time was the
possibility of a re-emergent Soviet empire, resulting in a di-
rect Russian military threat. Given what took place after
World War II, the unprecedented situation following the
end of the Cold War, and the quite fragile international
situation at the time, such a perspective was only natural.
In that context, membership in NATO was seen as an
irreversible confirmation of fundamental changes in
the post-Cold War security landscape. Yes, in those days,
NATO was seen as the sole, and sufficient, defender of
Poland. One might find such thinking naive. Nevertheless,
it was a tribute to the strong and effective role NATO had
played during the Cold War.
Our present expectations of NATO in regard to the
defence of Poland are more sophisticated. We understand
NATO is very important, albeit only one element in the
entire network of international security-related organisa-
tions and institutions. We also clearly see that security
threats and challenges are different today and continue to
evolve. We have learned our lessons as far as the func-
tioning of the North Atlantic Alliance is concerned, its
advantages and relative disadvantages. All told, we are no
longer a new to the family, thus our expectations con-
cerning its support are somewhat different.
In general terms, both the defence and security of Poland
rely on three basic instruments: our own military (and
political) potential, multilateral commitments and arrange-
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ments, and close bilateral partnerships with selected
nations. Obviously, those instruments should complement
and reinforce one another. Against this background,
NATO is seen as a major multilateral contributor to our
defence and security.
To focus on Poland’s defence, we see the most important
role for NATO in terms of ‘hardware’ security. The
organisation supports our own military capabilities, which
are in turn further strengthened through bilateral relation-
ships, in particular with the US. Such a perspective is not
based solely on historically motivated fear, nor on our
failure to recognise new security challenges. However,
regardless of our political ambitions, we are keenly aware
that our defence capabilities are not, on their own,
comparable to any of the major powers. We cannot allow
ourselves the luxury of standing alone, or nearly so, against
military threats. One might say NATO is Poland’s most
important insurance policy.
This is not to say we expect our allies to do the job for us.
We hope they will always be ready and willing to provide us
with decisive military assistance should it be needed, hence
the Polish ‘obsession’ with the continued validity of Article
V commitments. This should not be seen as a ‘conservative’
approach to the nature of the treaty, but rather a ‘realistic’
one. There are those who contend that as there are no
direct military threats to NATO members today, there is no
necessity to stress Article V, develop contingency plans,
and so on. I might respond in figurative terms: If the road
ahead is clear, you might change gears, but you don’t
change cars. For the last twenty years we have too often
seen how the security environment can dramatically change
almost overnight. I have in mind not only 9/11, but also the
events of August 2008.
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To be absolutely clear, the defence of Poland depends
heavily on NATO at present, and we would like to be able
to rely upon it in the future.
This not only implies a reliance on the deployment of
NATO forces on Polish territory in the case of an
emergency. We also expect it to remain a strong politico-
military organisation capable of deterring aggression, com-
manding well trained, equipped and immediately deploy-
able troops, conceiving realistic threat assessments, and
conducting military planning for all scenarios. To this end,
we would also be happy to see elements of NATO’s
infrastructure located on the Polish territory.
For NATO to reliably maintain its Article V commit-
ments does not mean it should be preserved in its Cold War
version, especially as collective defence today does not
necessarily imply territorial defence. On the contrary,
NATO has to evolve, adapt to new realities and continue
to transform itself. These processes, however, should take
place in a balanced and reasonable way. As difficult as it
may be for a Pole to accept, the truth is that the
deployment of forces under Article V (along with
deterrence) is no longer the only mission, as it was in the
past. Today, the very notions of ‘security’ and ‘defence’ are
much broader, making NATO’s tasks more complicated
than ever.
What helps in that context is the existence of the entire
network of security-related international institutions, of
which NATO is just one element, albeit the most
important. Those institutions – the EU, the UN, the OSCE
and others – are not directly involved in the military aspects
of the collective defence of any given nation, but their
contributions to different aspects of security can facilitate
NATO’s work. They are also indispensable partners for
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allied stabilisation operations, be it in the context of global
war on terror or in terms of other security risks.
Of course, the EU is a particular case, as it aspires
through the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)
to play a role in military aspects of global security (through
operations and missions) as well as in the formulation and
implementation of European defence policy. In an ideal
world, the EU and NATO would have complementary
capabilities and co-operate closely with each other at both
the strategic and operational levels. We do not, however,
live in such a world, at least not yet, hence the need for
close and effective institutional links and a mechanism for
co-operation and co-ordination. From the perspective of
Poland’s security and defence, NATO and the ESDP
should be two sides of the same coin. To state the obvious,
we do not expect the ESDP to develop at the expense of
NATO, nor vice versa.
Another observation with far-reaching implications for
NATO’s role in the actual defence of its members is that
nowadays we have to deal with a new and different pattern
of security threats, risks and challenges. To name just a few,
these include terrorism, weak and failed states, religious
fundamentalism, energy security and cyber-attacks. NATO
is prepared and equipped to undertake such challenges,
insofar as they require strong military capabilities. How-
ever, it also has to contribute whatever possible to the fight
with terrorism, as in Afghanistan. Along with other
organisations, it has to consider its role in providing for
energy security, such as the protection of critical civilian
infrastructure. It has to contribute, on a selective basis, to
world-wide stability, conflict management and crisis res-
ponse. If for no other reason, such responsibilities are
necessary to maintain international peace and security, and,
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by extension, to prevent the exposure of NATO allies to
potential threats.
The latter was one of three main reasons for Poland to
participate in operations in the Balkans, Iraq and, most
importantly, Afghanistan – the other two being the wish to
keep the Alliance effective and functional, and the
eagerness to prove Poland’s value as a provider (and not
just ‘net consumer’) of security. Needless to say, the
underlying Polish assumption in that regard was, and is,
that if we would help others, then others would help us if
and when necessary.
Is there any role for NATO beyond Article V?
A direct answer to this question is, of course, ‘yes.’ I be-
gan this article with collective defence to stress Poland’s
specific expectations. Even ‘those Poles’ recognise a num-
ber of extremely important tasks with which the Alliance is
now faced beyond, for example, contingency planning.
First and foremost, at the political level, we expect
NATO to serve as a bridge between Europe and North
America and as a mechanism for transatlantic co-opera-
tion. The days are gone of a Transatlantic Alliance
unquestionably united by fear. We must accept that mem-
bers of the Alliance have, and will continue to have,
different threat perceptions, and not simply different
interests but identical security priorities. Fortunately, they
are still united by common democratic values, respect for
human rights and a commitment to freedom. It is a solid
foundation on which the community – call it ‘Euro-
Atlantic’ or ‘transatlantic’, as you wish – can continue to
be built. This dynamic process will at times require
a contentious harmonisation of interests and intentions,
but must inevitably lead to jointly co-ordinated efforts.
Dr Adam Kobieracki
45
We expect the new US administration to take the lead in
this process, provided it is based on multilateral mecha-
nisms and institutions, and on a clear recognition (in not
only words, but deeds) that NATO’s European allies are
partners, not subcontractors. Such is a Polish recommenda-
tion for a healthy and effective North Atlantic Alliance, at
least in my personal opinion.
As mentioned, in addition to collective defence, NATO
will also be called upon to undertake crisis response and
stabilisation operations outside of its treaty area, and
rightly so. Poles will regard such involvement as selective,
based on political consensus among participants and in line
with overall allied strategy and threat assessment. Over the
last ten years or so, NATO has been conducting all kinds of
operations and missions – stabilisation, peacekeeping,
peace enforcement, training, humanitarian relief, crisis
response, and real combat, such as in Afghanistan. These
activities were linked to an endless search for a new identity
after the Cold War, a process that should finally be brought
to an end. Though it may not require starting from scratch,
there is clearly a need for NATO’s further transformation
and adaptation. It must, however, focus on appropriate,
21st-century means of usefully contributing to collective
defence and a more secure world.
In addition to the strategic and political issues above,
there is a long list of Polish expectations towards NATO
that are of a more pragmatic and military nature. Without
going into any details here, let me just mention them in no
particular order:
– Military interoperability;
– Co-operation of defence industries;
– The development of common projects;
– The sharing and pooling of military resources;
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– Balanced deployment of military infrastructure;
– Access to modern military technologies; and
– The introduction of best standards for military
operations.
At risk of being somewhat repetitive, I would here stress
the contributions of the Polish military to NATO, including
in its operations. Poland does not expect to be rewarded for
nothing. I hope the readers would also understand that, as
a humble diplomat and a generally modest person, I do not
complain here about the clear under-representation of
Polish citizens in NATO’s internal military and civilian
structures. As a matter of fact, as a former ASG for Ope-
rations, I was a Polish pioneer and would love to see my
successors in Brussels.
Back to business, however, there are two more issues that
I would like to cover in this section. The first is the political
role of NATO as a source of stabilisation and a promoter of
democratic standards and human values. NATO, in the
development of its military capabilities and their use for
noble purposes, should master its function as a political
centre of gravity. The best way forward in that regard is to
advance NATO partnerships with different nations, reach-
ing from the Mediterranean through the Gulf States to
Asia, Australia and beyond. We need partners not only for
political reasons, but as ‘brothers in arms and in civilian
reconstruction’ during our stabilisation missions.
The second issue is the enlargement of NATO. I take it
for granted that everybody expects Poland to be in favour
of a continued ‘open door’ policy, and rightly so. Do I really
need to explain the reasons? Just look at the map of
Europe and Eurasia, and find Ukraine and Georgia.
Finally, along those lines, a difficult issue: Russia, or, to
be more precise, NATO’s relationship with Moscow. Poles
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are quite often accused of being almost genetically anti-
Russian, thus unduly complicating that relationship. In my
humble view that question is more complex and can hardly
be fixed with simplistic stereotypes.
We in Poland are not biased vis-a`-vis Russia, but tend to
be cautious and – a key word – realistic. It should be re-
membered that in the wake of the political enthusiasm of the
1990s, almost everyone in the West predicted that Russia,
a truly great nation, would build a strong and real democracy
in a decade or so, as well as achieve full partnership with
NATO. It did not happen. There were also wide-spread and
high expectations concerning joint peacekeeping operations,
which also did not materialise. It was only when emotions
cooled and the Cold War dust settled that politicians and
nations started to comprehend what Poles had always known
almost instinctively: Russia has her own, sometimes specific,
interests, including security interests. It will take time and
effort to harmonise them with the interests of others, or at
least to render them non-confrontational.
So, the Polish perspective on NATO’s relationship with
Russia is that it has to be developed gradually and in
a pragmatic way. It should be accompanied by the
establishment of explicit aims, even if initially modest. But
we must not put the carriage before the horse, as in case of
the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). The NRC remains
a very useful tool, but at the moment of its inception the
two sides had very different ideas in terms of how to use it
and to what end. Institutional solutions should always
follow political understanding, not vice versa. Incidentally,
the same is true for the so-called ‘Medvedev Initiative’ –
Russia’s idea of a pan-European security treaty.
NATO and Russia could and should work together on
a number of security issues for their mutual benefit. Such
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co-operation may not be taken for granted, but it would
have to be based on shared values, common standards and
a focus on a pragmatic outcome, as well as patience and
realism. Is that anti-Russian?
NATO’s Future a` la Polonaise
I hope it is now obvious that following NATO’s
anniversary summit in early April 2009, work will start on
a new NATO Strategic Concept. It is long overdue. We all
need new strategic guidance for the future evolution of
NATO, its tasks and its missions. As said earlier, we also
need clarity as to what kind of operations NATO should
undertake, so as to put an end to doing a little bit of
everything. Also as mentioned, this new strategy must finally
put an end to the somewhat chaotic and at times desperate
efforts to find a ‘new identity’ for the North Atlantic
Alliance. Those efforts have only too often overshadowed
real progress and achievement in the transformation and
adaptation process, which could only benefit from clear and
consensual recommendations for its further direction.
As far as I can personally judge, Poland would expect the
following of the new strategic concept:
– To explicitly state NATO’s commitment and capability
to undertake Article V missions and security guarantees
when needed, as well as to conduct, or participate in, sta-
bilisation and crisis-response operations outside the treaty
area, on a selective basis and in line with the security
interests of member nations;
– To stress the need for the further development of
expeditionary capabilities, which are required for both
Article V and stabilisation missions;
– To recognise NATO as an essential consultation forum
on all security issues of concern to all member nations;
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– To maintain an ‘open door’ enlargement policy;
– To affirm the spirit of transatlantic solidarity as a guide
in the harmonisation of security priorities and in the ela-
boration of common approaches to different threats, risks
and challenges;
– To express NATO’s preparedness to consider new se-
curity threats and risks (terrorism, energy security chal-
lenges, cyber-attacks, etc.) with a view to determine how
NATO might contribute to addressing those threats and
risks, in line with its comparative advantages; and
– To acknowledge NATO as part of the entire network
of security-related organisations and institutions, with
which it is ready to co-operate.
From the Polish perspective, one of the most urgent
tasks for NATO must be to establish a real, functional and
efficient institutional mechanism for co-operation with the
EU, both at the strategic and operational levels. It is a sine
qua non condition for mutual complementarity, meaningful
co-ordination and the non-duplication of efforts, including
the development of military capabilities. Yes, it is a very
difficult task, but one that can no longer be avoided.
European security and global stabilisation may otherwise
be at risk.
The last thing Poland wants to see is growing competi-
tion between NATO and the EU in the security field. The
current financial and economic crisis should be seen as
a final warning that we do not have the luxury of spending
the same money twice for the same military capabilities, but
under different flags. And this is not just a financial issue –
it is strategic, political, military, whatever you wish. The
lack of proper EU-NATO co-operation is already adversely
affecting our otherwise common efforts (in the sense of
a common goal) in Afghanistan and Kosovo.
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The new strategic concept will also have to confirm that
NATO will continue to develop partnerships with other
nations, including in the field of stabilisation and crisis-
response operations. My earlier comments about partner-
ship with Russia is relevant in that context.
Some experts might be surprised that I have yet to
mention the absolutely crucial matter of the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation. I do not wish
to ignore it. Achieving our goals in Afghanistan constitutes
an obvious priority, both now and in the years to come. But
apart from operational lessons learned there, the need for
a ‘comprehensive approach’ to stabilisation and crisis-
response missions, and specific conclusions concerning
civilian-military operational planning, I do not think there
is a need to devote any special place for the ISAF in the
new strategic concept. An exception worth noting might be
to state that failure in Afghanistan is not an option. One
might also add that all NATO allies must share this
burden.
There are a number of other issues that this new strategic
concept should address, which I will not dwell upon in any
detail. These include, among others, new and realistic
threat assessments, military planning, training and exer-
cises, sharing of intelligence data, and the role of NATO in
disarmament and arms control. They are all important and
deserve special attention.
Conclusion
Altogether, the Polish recipe for NATO is to make sure
that it has all the requisite modern means to fulfil its
defence- and security-related tasks. We do not need to
reinvent NATO. We do have to invent and master new
instruments for its actions, which must be appropriate for
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the new security environment and must correspond to new
politico-military realities.
Make no mistakes as to Polish expectations vis-a`-vis
NATO. We continue to see it as a source of security
guarantees and a source of stability in a broader sense. But
even when we send our troops to Afghanistan, we do it with
a long-term view of strengthening NATO, including its core
function as enshrined in Article V. In this country, NATO
stabilisation and crisis-response operations are deemed
extremely significant, but nevertheless secondary tasks,
even if they constitute an obvious priority now and for
the foreseeable future. Times, however, may change.
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General Franciszek Ga˛gor
Chief of General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces
NATO’S RESPONSES TO A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT
1. Capabilities indispensable for expeditionary opera-
tions are also useful for collective defence.
NATO’s new strategy should maintain its emphasis on
Article V operations. It is commonly understood that all
NATO members should have the same security outlook,
hence as long as any member nation has concerns in terms
of its sovereignty or territorial integrity, the Alliance is
obliged to address them. Collective defence should remain
NATO’s basic mission, serving as a bond between the allied
nations. Yet, one cannot agree with the frequently raised
opinion that expeditionary capabilities are financed at the
expense of capabilities indispensable for collective security.
On the contrary, I would argue that expeditionary forces
improve capabilities for Article V operations, indicating no
contradiction between the two. It is difficult to imagine how
countries located far from politically unstable regions could
ensure their own mutual defence without experienced
expeditionary forces. Hence, the more expeditionary forces,
the greater the security of the entire Alliance and the better
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the preconditions for effective implementation of Article V
operations.
It is true, however, that attaining expeditionary capabil-
ities is more expensive. With that in mind, it would be fair
to allow member states located closer to regions of political
instability to maintain a relatively larger part of static
forces. In this way, these member nations would be able to
conserve resources so as to better prepare their relatively
smaller expeditionary forces.
It should be noted that part of the forces are naturally
designed for collective defence. This is the case with the air
defence system, which sooner or later will need to be
integrated into the new missile defence system. One must
also bear in mind that the entire allied training structure,
which falls under the Allied Command Transformation, is
static in nature.
2. NATO must be prepared to react to imminent
changes in frozen conflicts at its outskirts.
Frozen conflicts can sometimes easily become volatile
and endanger the region. The events in Georgia in August,
2008, showed how dangerous frozen conflicts can be to the
vital interests of adjacent NATO territories. Lulled by the
international community’s inaction, they can suddenly and
rapidly fall into a new phase of full-scale conflict,
endangering the security of member states. Given the secu-
rity concerns of NATO’s member states, the Alliance must
possess the military capability to quickly respond in defence
of the interests and values which are the basis, or even
raison d’eˆtre, of the transatlantic community.
One possible means by which to address this issue is the
proper adaptation of the NATO Response Force concept.
I have had occasion to present my own proposal in this
NATO – CHALLENGES AND TASKS AHEAD
54
regard at the NATO Military Committee. Similar in nature,
although in need of further specification, was an Allied
Solidarity Force approach recently presented by the United
Kingdom. There was also a Norwegian proposal on the
table. Besides a high readiness level of adequately prepared
forces, attention to the development of a swift decision-
making process for their use is much needed in order to
avoid situations in which a ‘decision right on target’ is made
too late in real terms. In this regard, one might recall that
the military conflict in Georgia was decided within three
days of fighting.
3. New threats and challenges require complex
countermeasures.
The Alliance’s newest challenges and threats – cyber-
terrorism, energy security, piracy, failed states – cannot be
exclusively addressed by military means. Added to this is
the difficulty of defining the casus belli for the majority of
such threats, as an increasing role will be played not only by
non-state actors such as terrorist organisations, but also by
groups of hackers. Consequently, it will be difficult to iden-
tify the responsible entities. Who should be addressed, if it
is not clear whether a government stands behind a particular
action? The strictly military responses used thus far are
clearly insufficient to face such threats.
The development of new response capabilities for such
threats should be predicated upon a clear definition of
policy that fully addresses their complexity. To date, such
attempts have been sporadic and fragmentary, and fre-
quently too careful. A hesitant approach risks becoming
outdated. One cannot build adequate capabilities (which
require time) based on documents negatively verified in
practice soon thereafter.
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It seems that NATO must go beyond its traditional military
functions and, as a community of countries linked by shared
security concerns, actively engage in other domains. Recently,
it has been increasingly apparent that one such area should
be international law, created under the auspices of the UN.
The effectiveness of efforts taken will be dependent on
international regulations. We need, for example, something
like a ‘cyber law’ or an ‘energy security law’, and new re-
gulations that will enable us to address piracy and the use of
international waters by terrorist or criminal organisations. We
also need a new approach for failed states and those that
serve as a safe haven for criminal organisations.
4. When dealing with new threats it is important not
only to have complex capabilities, but also a new
approach to their use.
To that end I suggest three pillars for success:
a) The development of the new capabilities;
b) Projecting their power, scope and the inevitability of
their use to potential adversaries, including non-state
actors; and
c) The ability to rapidly effect said capabilities when
needed.
The Alliance has plenty of homework to do with the
latter two pillars. In particular, mechanisms of the decision-
making process need to be improved to prevent obstruction
for minor reasons. Neither can one exclude taking
preventive action when the security of member states is at
stake. We have to act when threats become apparent, not
merely when they have occurred.
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5. Professionalisation is an indispensable step in
times of complex challenges.
The professionalisation of the Polish Armed Forces is
inter alia a response to the nature of new challenges. They
have such a complex nature that a traditional military based
on conscription could not face them effectively. Long-term
(e.g. two years or longer) military service is required to
ensure the proper training and skill sets for most functions.
Given the political unacceptability of mandating lengthy
military service, only a professional military, supported by
voluntary reserve forces, can ensure a proper level of
security. In this respect, the contribution of our profes-
sional armed forces helps ensure NATO’s ability to
adequately respond to new challenges.
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Dr Alyson JK Bailes*
NATO AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS
A ‘Comprehensive’ Approach for European Security?
The behaviour of NATO and the European Union (EU)
towards each other since their creation has had more than
a little in common with the behaviour of little boys and little
girls. At first – in fact, for much of the Cold War period –
they preferred to ignore each other. Each played in its own
domain and even if their effects were strongly complemen-
tary, especially in banishing the demon of war among
Western European states, any consistency was achieved by
steering from capitals rather than by contact between the
decision making bodies in Brussels. In fact, each institution
had a far more direct and substantive relationship with the
CSCE (later OSCE) than they did with each other: NATO
approaching the CSCE’s politico-military basket with
a common line, and the EU often supplying the main
western initiatives under the other baskets.
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As the Cold War neared its end and then under the new
agenda of the 1990s, some contact became unavoidable
since both organizations had entered at least one identical
playing field – the business of crisis management. Even
before the EU created its own military arm in the shape of
the European Security and Defence Policy, the efforts of
the institutions overlapped and became to a degree co-
dependent in the Western Balkans. By this time, however,
the Western European Union (WEU) had been revived as
a kind of European security policy caucus, and up to the
year 2000 it played the role both of a middle-man and safety
cushion between the two stronger institutions. The scope
for friction was also limited by the fact that NATO up to
this time was acting only in Europe, while the EU’s
diplomacy had always been worldwide in the commercial
dimension and was becoming so also in ‘softer’ security
contexts, like mediation and arms control.
The EU’s creation of ESDP made it impossible at last
for NATO and the Union to avoid each other, also because
it involved the virtual abolition of WEU. As is well known,
it caused a major problem over Turkey’s status which was
to place especial political and bureaucratic obstacles in
the way of the two institutions’ interacting normally. But
even if that specific problem had not delayed by two
years the first hand-over of a former NATO operation
(in Bosnia-Herzegovina) to the EU, and even if the USA
had not been predominantly sceptical about ESDP at the
time, we may suspect that the relationship would still have
had a scratchy start. Forced to learn more about each
other at first hand, the two institutions naturally saw each
other’s major differences first of all as aberrations and
problems. Not unlike little boys and girls, there were
competitive inclinations, superiority complexes and infer-
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iority complexes on both sides, as well as a temptation
to steal each other’s tricks and toys. And the area for the
two to trip over each other was widened with NATO’s
important policy shifts in 2002 that inaugurated its own
global role.
Eventually, of course, little boys and girls grow up to
realize that each other’s differences can be put to cons-
tructive and even pleasant use. Ways of coexistence can be
found that do not require either making the two more
identical, or subordinating one to the other. Are our West-
ern institutions in Europe ready for that kind of maturity?
The question is potentially a huge one, but the rest of this
text will explore it particularly by following the logic of what
NATO now calls a ‘comprehensive approach’.
‘Comprehensive’ security, in Afghanistan and Europe
The importance that the ‘comprehensive’ concept has
taken on for NATO reflects a learning process in itself. At
the time when the US led the first coalition operation in
Afghanistan and still when NATO took over the ISAF
command, confidence was high in Western military super-
iority and the challenge of weak states was seen above all as
being to crush the asymmetrical threats they harboured.
Today, we have been reminded of the old Vietnam lessons
about the resilience of a technologically inferior but fanatical
opponent, and about the risks of a porous frontier like that
with Pakistan: but also of the fact that weak states when
broken are the hardest to put back together. NATO is re-
learning both Afghan and regional politics, starting to grasp
that the real key to stabilization could lie not so much in
Helmand as in Kashmir. It has realized the importance of
local buy-in and local ownership, which cannot be bought
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just by well-behaved troops but demands concrete, expensive
inputs for development and welfare – and national leaders
who are (and are seen to be) more than Western puppets.
With today’s greater understanding of the importance of
image and perceived legitimacy, it is no accident that the
USA’s new President has taken the lead in gestures of
renewed respect for the UN, for Treaty law and interna-
tional legality generally. But the realization of the complex-
ity of trying to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan has equally
sharpened NATO’s awareness of what it cannot do itself
and must rely on others doing, including the EU as
a provider of civilian deployments, humanitarian and
development aid and many other functional inputs. The
need for multi-functional, multi-institutional approaches to
peacebuilding (anywhere in the world) is of course not just
a NATO discovery but one that is preoccupying the EU
itself as it seeks to coordinate its multitude of external
policy instruments. The economic crisis of 2008-9 has even
raised the question of whether the great International
Financial Institutions, hitherto so clearly demarcated from
the United Nations, should not become more security-
aware in their prescriptions – just as the more traditional
breed of crisis managers will have to become more
economics-aware.
The other major [re-]learning process that NATO is
undergoing at the moment concerns the need to look back
at Europe, and to remedy the damage that years of neglect
and ill-coordinated action have done both to stability and
political unity in the Alliance’s own heartland. Europe is
not, of course, Afghanistan and the challenges are more
about policy re-calibration than about risks of deadly
conflict, hopefully even in the Western Balkans. Yet the
needs are both serious enough and complex enough to
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suggest that, prima facie, an exercise in trying to apply the
‘comprehensive’ approach might be very timely for
Europe’s own purposes as well.
Here too, the dynamics have both a strategic and an
economic dimension that may be summed up in the words
‘Georgia’ and ‘financial crash’. The hostilities of August
2008 in Georgia should not, of course, have come as a sur-
prise but the very fact that NATO was caught as it were on
the back foot, and had so few options for response – even
compared with the EU or OSCE! – supplied a necessary
wake-up call. The most obvious lesson learned was that
Russia remains an unsolved problem, in terms of its
relations with the West, its relations with its closest
neighbours, and arguably its own self-image and style of
governance. Equally clear was the fact that the West’s own
policy on integrating states east of Central Europe had
been built more on wishful thinking than on any real grip or
mastery of the situation. The prospect of further NATO
and/or EU enlargement, while turning regional politics into
a zero-sum game with Russia, had not actually brought
speedy reform and westernization of the USA’s most
favoured candidate states: arguably it did more to tempt
their leaders into distinctly ‘un-Western’ behaviour. The
West could thus neither protect nor discipline its prospec-
tive recruits and, judging by Russia’s recent behaviour
towards the Baltic states, might have its work cut out even
to deter interference with its existing members.
While these lessons of the Georgian war soon swung
mainstream opinion in NATO and the EU against risking
the overstretch of any further Eastern enlargement for the
time being, the episode also highlighted how divided the
NATO members had become on such major questions of
strategy. Most ‘old’ allies had gone along only reluctantly
Dr Alyson JK Bailes
63
with any talk of enlargement beyond the Balkans, and many
also saw the USA’s own missile base plans as a needless
provocation. Some EU members had declined to recognize
Kosovo inter alia because of precisely the kind of precedent
Moscow claimed to be following when it recognized an
independent Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Some new
NATO and EU members, on the other hand, saw the war
as proof that they had been right to stay on their guard
against Russia all along and that NATO had not done
enough to make their own Western alignment unchallenge-
able, either militarily or politically. Why otherwise would
the prospective missile basing states have thought it so
essential and valuable to get US national guarantees?
Given the speed with which the Georgian incident as
such was smoothed down, perhaps NATO would not have
been impelled to re-examine its role in Europe by these
events alone. The loss of earlier self-confidence in and
about Afghanistan helped, but so did – and perhaps more
decisively – the economic crisis starting in late summer 2008
and still continuing today. If Georgia called in question the
credibility of NATO’s claims to extend its wing over Central
Europe without actually taking any military measures there
and while focusing its main strength abroad, the financial
travails of several new members have shown that the EU
model was installed there in an often hasty and fragile
fashion, all too reliant on foreign credit and sanguine
forecasts of growth. The ‘model’ itself is under challenge
everywhere in the EU as national politicians apply self-
serving and barely coordinated remedies and the inade-
quacy of common regional and global institutions, even in
sheer terms of capital available, is exposed. Putting all these
strains together, it is hardly exaggerated to say that the
European space is facing a risk of competitive re-natio-
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nalization and facing it, moreover, on top of a decade of
unusual division and stress – with the hoped-for renaissance
of the Lisbon Treaty still in limbo.
The mixing of these strategic, political and economic
pressures is enough in itself to justify the idea that Europe
today also needs comprehensive solutions. In fact, the word
‘comprehensive’ has for a long while been part of the
CSCE/OSCE vocabulary, where it carries just the right
meaning of an approach to security that ranges across all
functional boundaries and takes account of the totality of
relationships. The OSCE has also spelled out more clearly
than most institutions (eg in the 1999 ‘Platform of Co-
operative Security’) the need for different organizations to
work together for comprehensive results. So, what would be
an ideal prescription to allow Europe today to recover
confidence in its own security, and to do so in a way that
actively rebuilds intra-European and trans-Atlantic politi-
cal unity, while using all tools available in the most efficient
combination?
Roles for NATO and the EU
The good news for NATO – as well as the challenge! – is
that there are still some tasks that only it can perform. No
other institution, least of all the EU with its six non-Allied
members, has yet come forward to meet the ‘hard’ needs of
Western security or to re-create the strategic trans-Atlantic
bond. NATO is the forum where the leading Western
democracies must now face up to the issue of a possible
security deficit in Europe itself; must debate more frankly
than before how far it is an objective and how far a sub-
jective problem; and find some way of rebuilding con-
fidence and common purpose among all members, not just
in foreign fields but here on their own home ground. It is
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already clear, given the resource constraints, that the
solutions may be as much political as military: but that
was always the case even with NATO’s Cold War policies –
did anybody think ‘forward de´fence’ would ever work in
military-technical terms?
In fact, the more NATO can recapture the lessons of its
past experience in Europe, the more the long-term success
of the so-called Harmel concept combining defence and
‘de´tente’ will come to the fore. Strong defence and de-
terrence does not mean adventurism and aggression, but
rather the opposite. Taking the Russian challenge seriously
means also working seriously for stabilization and contain-
ment, through arms control, confidence building and the
recognition of certain wider frameworks and interests that
link all parts of the wider Europe regardless of political
regimes. It is clear that President Obama’s Administration
will seek to make up for lost time on arms control especially
in the nuclear sphere, probably back-pedalling on missile
defence in the process. For NATO’s health it is absolutely
crucial that this should become an enterprise for the whole
Alliance and that any progress with Russia should be a win-
win bargain for all Allies. For Washington and Moscow to
do hasty deals over others’ heads would be just as politically
erosive as it is for them to take turns provoking each other,
regardless of the fall-out in Europe.
Even for these tasks, however, NATO needs synergy with
and reinforcement from other institutions. On the Russian
issue it is clear that the handling of economic, energy, and
even many political aspects now falls to the EU. Both
NATO and the EU will need all their skills to retain some
influence in the former Soviet zone and to make sure Russia
does not consolidate a stifling hegemony there, given what
could be a very lengthy pause in enlargement combined with
NATO – CHALLENGES AND TASKS AHEAD
66
the smaller states’ economic woes. A good lesson from
Georgia is, however, that greater efforts to solve the
remaining ‘frozen conflicts’ will be worthwhile on all counts:
easing human distress, transnational threats, and blockages
to reform as well as denying Moscow more pretexts for
intervention. Here the need arises for some third process
that can handle joint Western and Eastern undertakings too
sensitive for direct action by either the EU or NATO. Much
weakened as the OSCE may be, if it did not exist there
might well be – in the present mood – a drive to invent it.
Could the proposed new European Security Treaty end up
as just such a re-invention, providing Russia and the West
with a process for re-making the rules of coexistence but
hopefully, ending up not too far away from the original
Helsinki acquis? The new Administration’s representatives
have already stated as a precondition that there must be no
freezing of spheres of influence, but perhaps even more
crucial would be to re-build a framework that not only
allows but hastens the self-transformation of Europe’s
transitional states. Which would be the better for Europe
in the long run, a Ukraine belonging to NATO but without
full democracy, or a Ukraine that was fully reformed, stable
and democratic with a recognized neutral status?
The EU with its wider competences has, if possible, an
even more daunting set of tasks than NATO. It has to
master the demons of nationalism and de-integration, to
maintain a single strategy for economic recovery where all
support all, and to find new regulatory and policy tools that
will not only stave off further disasters but reduce the West-
East inequalities so damagingly exposed by the crisis. At the
same time it has to speak for Europe’s interests in the
process of re-inventing financial and economic governance
at the world level, and in the renewed effort that might now
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be made to complete the world trade negotiations (the
WTO’s Doha Round). As already mentioned, it must strive
for a new level of integration and solidarity in its internal
energy affairs if it is ever to negotiate from strength with
Russia and other external suppliers. It has to make the most
of the new chance to work with a US Administration in the
battle over climate change, which in the long run could be
more decisive for mankind’s survival than any number of
purely economic disasters.
In the Cold War the EU was able to get on with such
tasks under a NATO umbrella that left it more or less free
of security duties. Today the Union has its own worldwide
strategy and takes responsibility for a wide range of func-
tional security topics – anti-terrorism, anti-proliferation,
anti-crime, transport and health security and more. But it
does still rely on NATO to provide the ultimate guarantee
for Europe’s own territory as well as shouldering the
toughest military tasks abroad. France’s planned return to
the NATO integrated military structure is a striking signal
of belief that the Alliance still provides something both
strategically and politically necessary for Europe. Beyond
this, the EU recognizes the usefulness of a CSCE-type
process perhaps more clearly than NATO has done in
recent years, and is also more closely engaged than NATO
with the UN across a range of global governance issues
including development aid. EU economic strategies, and
policies on certain issues at the economics/security inter-
face, are both shaped by and feed back into the leading
nations’ forum of the G8 (which may now to some extent be
supplanted by the G20). Finally, the EU seems gradually to
have learned the potential value of sub-regional organiza-
tions to look after development and ‘soft’ security issues in
the different parts of Europe, as shown by the effort it
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recently invested in re-tailoring the Northern Dimension
and – hopefully – in the quality of a new Baltic strategy to
be published soon.
There remain some challenges on which NATO and the
EU need to work together more directly or, at least, to
clarify new extensions of the demarcation line between
them. Keeping the peace in the Western Balkans and
completing the difficult process of steering all nations there
towards full integration, amid the complications caused by
Kosovo, is already recognized as a joint task where roles are
rather clearly defined. An interesting new example would
be how to handle the fall-out, hopefully positive, of a final
UN-brokered settlement in Cyprus. More general emerging
tasks include a functional one – the respective and
coordinated roles to be played by military and civil assets
in disaster response, which will become a growing burden
for Europe itself with climate change; and a geographical
one – the representation of Western interests in the
forthcoming opening-up of the Arctic. Both organizations,
of course, in their own ways will be trying to maintain the
values of democracy both within and between their own
states, and to make sure that a more cautious incoming
phase in Western strategies is not read – anywhere in the
world – as a retreat from fundamental Western values.
Compared with the repair and renewal work to be done
in the greater Europe, NATO and EU coexistence in
missions further afield should really not be today’s greatest
problem. The political conditions are set fair from the US
side, the French side, and perhaps even in the sensitive
Turkey/Greece/Cyprus nexus if the Cyprus negotiations
already mentioned can make progress and if the West’s new
approaches in the Middle East and Iraq cause the need for
Turkish partnership there to be better appreciated. In
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practical terms, both institutions are feeling overstretch and
are ready more frankly to face up to their limitations.
Enough time has passed for the comparative advantages of
each as an overseas problem-solver to be better understood
and for the de facto demarcation between their missions of
choice to become clearer. The USA’s new attitude to the
UN and international regulation should bring relevant
aspects of the NATO culture closer to the EU’s. Last and
not least, there will surely be no lack of cases requiring both
institutions’ help even after Iraq is evacuated and even if an
exit strategy can be found for Afghanistan. Both the
working through of climate change, and the breaking strain
put on many weak states by current economic develop-
ments, seem bound to keep up the tempo of conflict
outbreaks even on the – hopefully solid – assumption that
direct great-power conflict remains a thing of the past.
The Way Forward
The shift of international agendas since the economic
crash and with the arrival of President Obama has already
passed some milestones. In the context of main interest
here, one was the publication in December 2008 of the
EU’s reassessment of its December 2003 Security Strategy,
which had a noticeably less triumphalist tone and offered
a more complex risk analysis – including more open
admission of problems with Russia – than the original
document. This paper, produced by Javier Solana’s staff,
but also the procedural decisions taken by the EU Council
of Ministers and European Council in the same month kept
stressing the importance of an EU-NATO ‘strategic
partnership’. More specifically, the latest EU policy
statement on ESDP proposed a new high level group of
NATO and EU representatives to discuss joint tasks. From
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the US side, both President Obama himself and leaders
from his new Administration, such as Vice-President Jo
Biden speaking at the Munich Security Conference in
February 2009, have promised to use a ‘re-set’ button to
correct the more divisive policies of the Bush period
including its hostility towards fixed partnerships and
institutions as such.
For NATO itself, the key next steps are the holding of
the Strasbourg 60th Anniversary Summit which should
solemnize France’s return to the military structure; plus the
process that may be launched there to review the Alliance’s
Strategic Concept (last formulated in 1999). Such a strategy
review is, on the face of it, the natural way and place to
crystallize the new or renewed ideas that all Allies need to
agree on regarding both the Alliance’s own role, and its
complementarity with other institutions. Some observers
are worried precisely about the effect a negotiating process
could have in exposing the true depth of divisions, or per-
haps even undermining practical aspects of NATO work
that have been able to muddle along so far without probing
too much into states’ true motives. The judgement is
a tough one to call; but it is probably safe to say that a con-
tinuation of muddling through, while reducing the political
stakes, is also likely to reduce still further the Alliance’s
relative standing and output. The EU faces rather similar
risks with the launch of its latest high-level reflection group,
which is tasked with looking into issues of the Union’s
ultimate shape and mission that could reawake all the most
sensitive internal debates over pooling of sovereignty on the
one hand, and the ultimate geographical limits of inte-
gration on the other.
In the end, it is nation states that still decide in Europe
how the European institutions will evolve. For the latest
Dr Alyson JK Bailes
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review exercises to succeed in building new consensus
within and between the EU and NATO, and for the
relations and burden-sharing among all of Europe’s
institutions to become more rational, it is attitudes in
capitals that must change first and foremost and national
reactions that must be disciplined and refined. In a Europe
as large as today’s has become, better understanding and
more coherent joint platforms among states in regional
groupings would also help a lot. In international institu-
tions’ cooperation just as in relations between the genders,
maturity must begin at home.
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Paweł S´wieboda*
On a lighter note
What follows is a letter drafted by European Union officials on
the occasion of celebrating NATO’s sixtieth anniversary. It was
written in German with French corrections. The working English
translation reads:
Dear Big Sister NATO,
Happy Birthday!
To be frank, I never thought you would still be around at
this point. No offence, but I thought it would be ‘mission
accomplished’ for you after the Cold War. You really
played it well: no bullets fired, that guy Walesa there and
the wall crumbling. Good stuff. Many of my members
thought you should have claimed success and closed shop,
that doing so would make you shine in the history books.
But you decided otherwise and went on addressing inter-
national crises of all kinds. I didn’t much like that, you
know. I thought it was my turn, and you really just made
things more difficult with your blunt and outdated
instruments.
President of the foundation demosEUROPA – Centre for European
Strategy (Warsaw)
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Some of my members genuinely believe you’ve become
counterproductive to the task you were created for: to
guarantee security in Europe. I mean, everybody knows you
were there for different reasons. A while ago, the real
question was how I could use your military tools. Now you
want to turn the question around to how you should take
advantage of my resources and experience.
You were for some time a clearing house for the ‘coa-
lition of the willing’, led by your uncle George W. I always
suspected that was exactly what you needed enlargement
for: to have a larger group of like-minded friends to choose
from, this ‘New Europe’ thing. To that end, you even
contemplated opening up to Israel, Australia and Japan.
And look at our old friends the Russians. You know, we
really do need to get along with them. They ARE our next-
door neighbours. We’d already be in each others’ arms if it
wasn’t for your cocksure behavior in the 90s. I mean, you
didn’t even want to change your name!
You were smart with the new members, I have to say.
I got them on board as well. My God, they cost me dearly
but they are nice folks. I love their obsession with the
Russians. It is so charming. Makes me sentimental for the
good old days when we thought the Russians would sweep
across Europe in a day or two. We were young and beauti-
ful then. Now the Polish youngsters want to take you over...
Well, well.
High time for the real stuff now. I think we need a deal.
Your new uncle Joe came up with the ‘reset’ button for the
Russians. It looked more like a nuclear button, but in any
case – have you got one for me? Let’s sit down, discuss and
plan for it together. You remember our grandfather Freud
and his ‘narcissism of minor differences’? Well, let’s tell our
folks that they need to get a grip on things. The West is
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back. Your other new uncle knows that. I’m willing to trust
you again and play together, from combining our strategic
concepts to force planning. We could build a comprehen-
sive approach that makes the most of our civil-military
experience, and then move on to the harmonisation of
equipment programmes. In general, we should talk about
what we can do for one another rather than what we
cannot. We can become relevant actors in the security field,
but we could also sink in oblivion.
Do you think we could have a dinner together again
sometime?
Yours,
The European Union
(twenty-seven illegible signatures)
Paweł S´wieboda
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Jamie Shea*
Dear European Union,
Thank you very much for your kind letter of congratula-
tions and for sending Mr. Solana to our summit in
Strasbourg/Kehl to deliver it in person. Thank you also
for enabling us to use Strasbourg, the city symbolizing
European unification, and the home of the European
Parliament, as the venue for our 60th anniversary NATO
Summit. Hopefully you will invite us to your EU sixtieth
anniversary in 2017, and we invite you already to hold this
event in Washington and to meet in the same government
building where the Treaty of Washington was signed on
4th of April 1949. What better symbol of transatlantic unity
and our own bilateral rapprochement could we have than to
put European integration firmly in its transatlantic context.
We sincerely hope that your cohesion will not be under-
mined by the current financial crisis. After all, this crisis
should be an opportunity to demonstrate the value of the
Euro in protecting us from global market fluctuations and
in enhancing support and solidarity for the new EU
Dr. Jamie Shea is the Director of Policy Planning in the Private Office
of the Secretary General of NATO. This is a spontaneous and much
appreciated by conference participants reaction to P. S´wieboda’s ‘EU’s
Anniversary Letter to NATO’.
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member states whose economies have suffered the most.
The great historical importance of the EU is to allow
Europe to withstand global shocks and not to be weakened
by them.
By the way, we also hope that the Lisbon Treaty will be
adopted before too long, even though it is not for us to
advise the Irish on how they should vote. Frankly, we need
the European Union to be an outward looking, cohesive
and acting institution. This presupposes that the EU is able
to have a pause from the exercise of treaty drafting and
constitution building, which in recent years has consumed
so much time and political energy. Although it is important
to perfect the instruments for crisis management and
military deployments, it is even more important to use
those instruments. This would also help NATO by showing
a greater European willingness to shoulder the burden of
today’s challenges; and not only those of tomorrow.
If we may, and using this opportunity to reply to the
suggestions in your letter, we could suggest a few things
that would not only be useful for you, but also greatly
benefit NATO.
The first concerns strategic purpose. We fully understand
the utility of the EU common foreign and security policy in
demonstrating to the outside world that the EU is now
a mature, capable actor and that a unified European foreign
policy is a reality. The twenty plus CFSP missions carried
out thus far have done much good in the world. However,
what has perhaps been lacking is a sense of Europe’s
strategic priorities and immediate security interests. Where
does Europe need to focus its efforts and achieve results?
Where should it engage long term rather than short term?
As Churchill once said: ‘However beautiful the strategy, one
should occasionally look at the results.’
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Second, we in NATO believe that Afghanistan is not only
our top priority at the present time but also the most
important security challenge facing all the Western
democracies. Failure there would expose all of us to
extremism and more well organized terrorist attacks. So
Afghanistan in not only or even primarily a NATO
responsibility. It concerns Europeans as much as Amer-
icans, whatever institutions they choose to coordinate their
responses. So clearly NATO welcomes the greater EU role
in Afghanistan, in police training, development aid and
more recently gendarmerie, but we would like to see even
more efforts. The EU has much to contribute in areas
where NATO lacks capabilities especially on the police and
civilian side. The financial crisis is making us even more
aware that we have limited resources. We cannot be
everywhere. NATO and the EU have to bring their
complementary resources more closely together to serve
common strategies for solving common problems. To
disperse or to work in isolation is to fail.
Thirdly, be more demanding. One of the things in NATO
that we’ve tried to point out since the end of the Cold War
is you don’t get the benefits of membership without
demanding in return the contribution from your members.
We believe in NATO that you in the EU have been very
content to supply the benefits, but have been less
demanding than we have been in terms of what your
members should be contributing. Therefore there is a gap
between ambition and resources. We like this idea that
French president Sarkozy has been pushing for reinforced
cooperation and convergence criteria among those EU
members that want to pursue a closer form of integration
and we very much hope that once the Lisbon Treaty has
been ratified this idea can go into effect.
Jamie Shea
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Number four – we would love EU if you could be more
open to synergies with NATO. We understand that you’re
an independent organization and will remain so. We have
no objection as NATO to the EU having set up [This is
a futuristic letter] your own operational headquarters to
carry out your missions. If that is what you wish, although
we should try to avoid duplication as much as possible. But
we do believe that there is room for joint planning, joint
certification, coordinated commands, integrated headquar-
ters for operations. We only have a single set of forces and
we should put them together.
Finally, dear EU, on the occasion of our sixtieth
anniversary and looking to your sixtieth anniversary, we
would like you to be more self-confident. The idea that
NATO or the United States could be a threat to European
integration suggests that you believe that you are far more
fragile than you really are. To sense that anybody could
hold or break the process with European integration is
a signal of lack of self-confidence in your own project. So
please, dear EU, be a more self-confident institution,
because in that way you will not only serve your own
purposes, but also those of the Transatlantic Alliance.
Thank you very much indeed for your letter. We hope
that you will read ours one day.
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On the 60th anniversary of NATO
a n d
the 10th anniversary of Polish accession to the Alliance
The Center for International Relations
with the Ministry of National Defence
in cooperation with NATO HQ
the Euro-Atlantic Association, Poland
and the Atlantic Council of the United States
cordially invite you to the international conference
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13t h March 2009 – Warsaw
Hotel Sofitel Victoria, ul. Kro´lewska 11
09:00 Opening of the conference
Welcome by Eugeniusz Smolar  President, Center for
International Relations
Key-Note Speeches:
. Hon. Donald Tusk  Prime Minister of the Republic
of Poland
. Hon. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer  Secretary General
of NATO
. Questions and answers session moderated by Ambassador
Jerzy M. Nowak – President of the Euro-Atlantic Associa-
tion, former Permanent Representative of Poland to NATO
(2002-2007).
10:00  12:00 PANEL I: A Strong Alliance
. Hon. Bogdan Klich  Poland0s Minister of National
Defence
Moderator: Eugeniusz Smolar  CIR President
. NATO 60 years later  achievements and also significance
for Poland;
. Political and military aspects of NATO functioning  historical
and current perspective;
. Solidarity in defence as the fundamentals of NATO0s
credibility;
. Defence alliance in the transatlantic region and the
international security stabilizing functions (6out-of-area0
operations).
. Chrisitian Schmidt – Parliamentary State Secretary,
the Federal Ministry of Defence, Berlin
. Prof. Adam Daniel Rotfeld – former Polish Minister for
Foreign Affairs, former director of SIPRI, Stockholm.
. Dr. Andrew Michta – Professor at George C. Marshall
European Center for Security Studies
12:00  13:00 Lunch
13:00  15:00 PANEL II: Cooperation or division of roles?
Moderator: Frederick Kempe  President and the CEO,
Atlantic Council of the United States
 Role of NATO in United States0 security strategy;
 Differences among the European Allies0 policies and their
contribution to NATO functioning
 The significance of France0s return to NATO military
structures;
 Present and desired state of cooperation between NATO and
the European Union, UN, OSCE and other actors of the
international scene.
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. Dr. Jamie Shea  Director of Policy Planning
in the Private Office of the Secretary General
of NATO
. Muriel Domenach – Deputy Head, Centre d0Analyse et
de Prevision, MFA, Paris
. Dr. Karl-Heinz Kamp – Director, Research Division,
NATO Defense College in Rome
. Dr. Alyson Bailes – VisitingProfessor, Dep. of Political
Science, University of Iceland in Reykjavik, former
director of SIPRI, Stockholm
. Paweł S´wieboda – Director, demosEuropa, Warsaw
15:00  15:30 Coffee Break
15:30  17:30 PANEL III: NATO – Adequate Answers
. Hon. Radosław Sikorski  Poland0s Minister of Foreign
Affairs
Moderator: dr Janusz Reiter, Head of the Center for International
Relations Council, former ambassador to the US and Germany
 Old and new threats  NATO0s level of preparation to meet
them (cyber-terrorism, critical infrastructure, energy security,
other asymmetric threats);
 Necessity to change the nature of the NATO 6out-of-area0
missions
 Regional security, influencing stability in the East;
 Professionalization of the Polish Armed Forces, Polish input
in NATO integration (level of compatibility and interoperatio-
nality).
. Michel Miraillet  Undersecretary of Defence for Policy,
Director for Strategic Affairs, Ministry of Defence,
Paris
. General Franciszek Ga˛gor  Chief of General Staff of
the Polish Armed Forces
. Kurt Volker  U.S. Permanent Representative to the
North Atlantic Council
. Dr Hans Binnendijk  Vice President for Research,
National Defense University, Washington
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. Adam Kobieracki  director of Dept. of International
Security, Polish MFA, former NATO Assistant
Secretary General for Operations
17:30  17:45 6Diplomacy and International Affairs: contest award cere-
mony, organized by the Euro-Atlantic Association 
Dr. Jerzy Nowak, President of the Euro-Atlantic Asso-
ciation
17:45 END OF THE CONFERENCE  Dr. Jerzy Nowak,
President of the Euro-Atlantic Association
The conference was made possible thanks to the financial support of
the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Poland.
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Donald Tusk – Prime Minister of Poland and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer –
Secretary General of NATO
Donald Tusk – Prime Minister of Poland
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Bogdan Klich – Poland’s Minister of National Defence
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Radosław Sikorski – Poland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs
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Panel I
Panel II
Panel III
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